kryptering

https://therecord.media/sweden-seeks-backdoor-access-to-messaging-apps

Sweden’s law enforcement and security agencies are pushing legislation to force Signal and WhatsApp to create technical backdoors allowing them to access communications sent over the encrypted messaging apps.

Signal Foundation President Meredith Whittaker said the company would leave the Swedish market before complying with such a law, Swedish news outlet SVT Nyheter reported Monday.

[..]

Because the bill would mandate that Signal build backdoors in its software, Whittaker told the outlet, it would weaken the messaging app’s entire network.

The Swedish Armed Forces routinely use Signal and are opposing the bill, saying that a backdoor could introduce vulnerabilities that could be exploited by bad actors.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo

Apple is taking the unprecedented step of removing its highest level data security tool from customers in the UK, after the government demanded access to user data. Advanced Data Protection (ADP) means only account holders can view items such as photos or documents they have stored online through a process known as end-to-end encryption. But earlier this month the UK government asked for the right to see the data, which currently not even Apple can access. Apple did not comment at the time but has consistently opposed creating a “backdoor” in its encryption service, arguing that if it did so, it would only be a matter of time before bad actors also found a way in. Now the tech giant has decided it will no longer be possible to activate ADP in the UK. It means eventually not all UK customer data stored on iCloud - Apple’s cloud storage service - will be fully encrypted. Data with standard encryption is accessible by Apple and shareable with law enforcement, if they have a warrant.

Benedict Evans:

Of course, the UK is within its rights to choose one side of the trade-off in the UK - what’s bizarre here is that the UK is apparently demanding that Apple do this globally. The UK, apparently, is trying to tell a US company what products it can provide to customers in Japan, Australia or indeed the USA. Normally it’s only American regulators that assert global juristiction. But what will the UK government say when China reads this story, and orders Apple to hand over UK citizens’ data, given that it’s now unencrypted and the UK has conceded the principle of jurisdiction? [emphasis added]

https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/us-officials-urge-americans-use-encrypted-apps-cyberattack-rcna182694

Amid an unprecedented cyberattack on telecommunications companies such as AT&T and Verizon, U.S. officials have recommended that Americans use encrypted messaging apps to ensure their communications stay hidden from foreign hackers.

The hacking campaign, nicknamed Salt Typhoon by Microsoft, is one of the largest intelligence compromises in U.S. history, and it has not yet been fully remediated. Officials on a news call Tuesday refused to set a timetable for declaring the country’s telecommunications systems free of interlopers. Officials had told NBC News that China hacked AT&T, Verizon and Lumen Technologies to spy on customers.

https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/09/nist-proposes-barring-some-of-the-most-nonsensical-password-rules/

Proposed guidelines aim to inject badly needed common sense into password hygiene.

1. Verifiers and CSPs SHALL require passwords to be a minimum of eight characters in length and SHOULD require passwords to be a minimum of 15 characters in length.
2. Verifiers and CSPs SHOULD permit a maximum password length of at least 64 characters.
3. Verifiers and CSPs SHOULD accept all printing ASCII [RFC20] characters and the space character in passwords.
4. Verifiers and CSPs SHOULD accept Unicode [ISO/ISC 10646] characters in passwords. Each Unicode code point SHALL be counted as a single character when evaluating password length.
5. Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types) for passwords.
6. Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT require users to change passwords periodically. However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator.
7. Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT permit the subscriber to store a hint that is accessible to an unauthenticated claimant.
8. Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT prompt subscribers to use knowledge-based authentication (KBA) (e.g., “What was the name of your first pet?”) or security questions when choosing passwords.
9. Verifiers SHALL verify the entire submitted password (i.e., not truncate it).

https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2024/08/25/telegram-is-not-really-an-encrypted-messaging-app/

This post is inspired by the recent and concerning news that Telegram’s CEO Pavel Durov has been arrested by French authorities for its failure to sufficiently moderate content. While I don’t know the details, the use of criminal charges to coerce social media companies is a pretty worrying escalation, and I hope there’s more to the story.

But this arrest is not what I want to talk about today.

What I do want to talk about is one specific detail of the reporting. Specifically: the fact that nearly every news report about the arrest refers to Telegram as an “encrypted messaging app.” Here are just a few examples:

This phrasing drives me nuts because in a very limited technical sense it’s not wrong. Yet in every sense that matters, it fundamentally misrepresents what Telegram is and how it works in practice. And this misrepresentation is bad for both journalists and particularly for Telegram’s users, many of whom could be badly hurt as a result.

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2024/05/the-uk-bans-default-passwords.html

The UK is the first country to ban default passwords on IoT devices.

https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/01/hackers-can-id-unique-apple-airdrop-users-chinese-authorities-claim-to-do-just-that/

Chinese authorities recently said they’re using an advanced encryption attack to de-anonymize users of AirDrop in an effort to crack down on citizens who use the Apple file-sharing feature to mass-distribute content that’s outlawed in that country.

In the face of an escalating military conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah forces, the Israeli government has asked citizens to secure home security cameras or shut them down completely, fearing the devices could be hacked and used for espionage and intelligence collection.

In a memo on Friday, Israel’s National Cyber Directorate has asked camera owners to change their passwords, enable two-factor authentication if present, and enable automatic security updates.

If camera owners can’t change any of their settings, officials have urged owners to either cover camera lenses or shut down devices completely.Israeli officials aren’t taking any chances and have most likely learned a vital lesson from the recent Russo-Ukrainian conflict, where security cameras across Ukraine have been hacked by Russian hackers to track military aid convoys and adjust missile targeting in real-time.

[…]

In addition, there is also a propaganda aspect to take into consideration. Since the initial Hamas attack on October 7, footage taken from hacked security cameras showing Hamas rockets hitting Israeli homes has also been widely shared online.

Risky Biz News: Israel warns citizens of security camera hack risk

The initial data leak was limited, with the threat actor releasing 1 million lines of data for Ashkenazi people. However, on October 4, the threat actor offered to sell data profiles in bulk for $1-$10 per 23andMe account, depending on how many were purchased.

A 23andMe spokesperson confirmed the data is legitimate and told BleepingComputer that the threat actors used exposed credentials from other breaches to access 23andMe accounts and steal the sensitive data.

[…]

The information that has been exposed from this incident includes full names, usernames, profile photos, sex, date of birth, genetic ancestry results, and geographical location.

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/genetics-firm-23andme-says-user-data-stolen-in-credential-stuffing-attack/

While there are benefits to storing genetic information online so people can trace their heritage and track down relatives, there are clear privacy threats. Even if a user chooses a strong password and uses two-factor authentication as 23andMe has long urged, their data can still be swept up in scraping incidents like the one recently confirmed. The only sure way to protect it from online theft is to not store it there in the first place.

https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/10/private-23andme-user-data-is-up-for-sale-after-online-scraping-spree/

https://infosec.exchange/@epixoip/109585049354200263

You see, I’m not simply recommending that users bail on LastPass because of this latest breach. I’m recommending you run as far way as possible from LastPass due to its long history of incompetence, apathy, and negligence. It’s abundantly clear that they do not care about their own security, and much less about your security.

So, why do I recommend Bitwarden and 1Password? It’s quite simple: